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Atherton et al.: Fiduciary Principles

INTRODUCTION
The lack of trust in American corporations and in corporate management over the
recent scandals and financial crisis has increased public and legislative outcry for
accountability in business decisions. Frustration is rampant, with “seemingly
unending examples of mismanagement, ethical misconduct, and patterned
dishonesty of a society dubbed ‘the cheating culture’.”1 International competition
created tremendous risks and rewards but forced companies to attract investors
through creative accounting practices to raise share value. As a result, three
decades of corporate greed, inappropriate financial risk-taking and personal
misconduct eroded trust in corporate decision-making.2
Corporate governance reform initiatives beginning in 2002 were designed
to increase financial disclosure and responsibility; however, such legislation is
insufficient to rebuild public trust in business. Restoring trust requires that those
individuals who manage corporations, i.e., the board of directors and senior
officers, comply with requirements for greater accountability and transparency,
and abide by the legal norms to which boards of directors and management are
already subject, as directors and officers are legally bound as fiduciaries owing
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation.3 However, centuries of legal and
religious formalization and codification have diminished the actual meaning and
purpose of fiduciaries, with the result that modern corporate fiduciaries have
limited responsibility toward stakeholders and the greater society. Restoring the
original definitions and roles of fiduciaries may legitimize and guide the
corporation in developing new relationships with stakeholders.
This paper does not focus on illegal conduct by corporate individuals,
although many criminal violations of fiduciary norms involve intentional
assessment of the risk of penalties versus potential profits.4 Rather, the paper
examines the limitations of today’s corporate fiduciary duties given the original
intent of the fiduciary relationship. In particular, we examine the definitions of
fiduciaries and fiduciary responsibilities to determine the extent to which
formalization and codification have led to avoidance of corporate responsibility.
We then revisit the historical and religious origins of fiduciaries in commercial
transactions that defined and shaped the integration of moral and ethical duties in
1

See David Callahan, The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead
(Florida: Harcourt, Inc., 2004), 12.
2
See LaRue Tone Hosmer, The Ethics of Management, 6th Ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008).
3
Peter C. Kostant, Meaningful Good Faith: Managerial Motives and the Duty to Obey the Law, 55
N.Y.L.S.L. Rev., 421 (2010).
4
Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L.S.L. Rev., 457 (2010).
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business today yet were so narrowly defined that corporate liability became
increasingly limited. We propose a modest but well-defined, consistent and
universal definition of “fiduciary duties,” that could offer corporate managers
guidance in developing new approaches to stakeholder relationships –
relationships built on expectations of corporate trust and decision-making that
maximize shareholder wealth while protecting stakeholders.
THE MODERN FIDUCIARY
Most business students and executives today are introduced to the concept of a
“fiduciary” in the context of agency law, where a fiduciary is defined as “one who
has a duty to act primarily for another person’s benefit,” and agency is generally
defined as “the fiduciary relation that results from the manifestation of consent by
one person (a ‘principal’) to another (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests or
otherwise consents so to act.”5 Restatemetn (Third) of Agency states that proof of
an agency relationship requires the existence of the manifestation by the principal
that the agent shall act for him; the agent’s acceptance of the undertaking; and, the
understanding that the principal is in control of the undertaking. The agency
relationship that results is founded on trust, confidence, and good faith by one
person in the integrity and fidelity of another, creating certain duties owed by
each party established in the agency agreement and implied by law.6 Within the
relationship, fiduciaries have a duty of loyalty – the duty to act primarily for
another in matters related to the activity and not for the fiduciary's own personal
interest.
Fiduciaries also have a duty of good faith – the duty to act with scrupulous
good faith and candor; complete fairness, without influencing or taking advantage
of the client. The fiduciary relationship, as defined by history and case law, exists
in every business transaction. Moreover, the relationship is defined by the specific
role or function of the agent toward the principal, i.e., the relationship of
corporate management and boards of directors to shareholders, lawyer to client, or
broker to client, and governed by the laws associated with those transactions,
including criminal and labor law, securities and corporate law, contracts,
partnerships, and trusts.7 The roles of trustees, administrators, and bailees as
fiduciaries were of ancient origin, whereas agents appeared only at the end of the

5

Restatement (Third) of Agency, 3rd Ed. §1(1). (2006), Restatement Third of Agency is a set of
principles issues by the American Law Institute, frequently cited by judges as well as attorneys
and scholars in making legal arguments.
6
Nancy Kubasek et al., Dynamic Business Law (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2009), 856,857.
7
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795, 797-802 (1983).
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eighteenth century.8 Partners, corporate boards of directors, and corporate officers
held fiduciary duties originating with the formation of modern partnerships and
corporations, as did majority shareholders, while union leaders held fiduciary
roles only when unions were granted power by statute to represent workers in
negotiations with management.9 While modern definitions of these duties remain
intact, the scope of the duties greatly varies based on the fiduciary’s role, which
increases the complexity of analysis required to understand violations of those
duties.
The modern definition of “agent” as a fiduciary was first rationalized and
clarified as a legal doctrine in 1933:10 “When the person acting is to represent the
other in contractual negotiations, bargainings or transactions involved in business
dealings with third persons, or is to appear for or represent the other in hearings or
proceedings in which he may be interested, he is termed an ‘agent,’ and the
person for whom he is to act is termed the ‘principal.’” The element of continuous
subjection to the will of the principal distinguishes the agent from other
fiduciaries and the agency agreement from other agreements.11 This implies that
corporate officers and directors are also agents. However, in law and practice
today, the fiduciary roles of corporate officers and directors are not “continuous
subjection to the will of the principal (shareholders)” but more flexible as officers
and directors make many decisions not approved by shareholders.
Further, the duties of officers and directors are distinct from those of other
corporate employees. Corporate officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders (as defined by state case law and Delaware corporate law) while
employees as agents owe duties to employers, suppliers, vendors, or customers in
a wide variety of relationships involving trust.12 This distinction has created a
two-tiered definition of fiduciaries, each with different duties, and varying
liabilities for breaches of those duties, and is supported by economic theory. Such
differentiation in fiduciary roles does not appear to be the intention, either
historically or in modern corporate law. In 1928, Judge Benjamin Cardozo, then
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, eloquently recognized the
significance and sanctity of fiduciary principles in Meinhard v. Salmon:13
8

See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev., 801-802.

9

See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev., 801-802.
Deborah A. DeMott, “The First Restatement of Agency: What Was the Agenda?,” 32 S. Ill. U.
L.J., (2007). Restatement (Second) of Agency, 1958, the American Law Institute, is now out of
print and has been completely superseded and replaced by Restatement of the Law Third, Agency,
2006. However, some courts will continue to cite to The Restatement of the Law Second, Agency.
11
Deborah A. DeMott, “The First Restatement of Agency: What Was the Agenda?,” 31.
12
Kenneth M. Rosen, Meador Lecture Series 2005-2006: Fiduciaries, 58 Ala. L. Rev., 1041 (2007).
13
Kenneth M. Rosen, Meador Lecture Series 2005-2006: Fiduciaries, citing Meinhard v. Salmon,
164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
10
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[J]oint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another… the duty of the finest
loyalty… and the level of conduct for fiduciaries has been kept at a higher level
than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any
judgment of this court.

Cardozo’s opinion reflects three important principles that reinforce a long line of
precedent in defining a special level of fidelity for all fiduciaries: 1) fiduciary
matters demand a higher standard than normal marketplace transactions; 2)
exceptions to the fiduciary standard undermine the duty of loyalty; and 3) neither
courts nor regulators who interpret, enforce or modify the fiduciary standard
should consciously weaken it.14 Supreme Court Justice Brandeis later noted that a
fiduciary "is an occupation which is pursued largely for others and not merely for
oneself… in which the amount of financial return is not the accepted measure of
success."15
Fiduciary Duties: The Required Triad
The Delaware Supreme Court, renowned for its corporate governance decisions
and the source of the primary legal standards for the duties and liabilities of
corporate officers, ruled in 1993, re-affirmed in 2006, and again in 2010, that the
“triad” of duties includes the duty of loyalty, due care and good faith, where
“good faith” and “full and fair disclosure” are considered to be the essential
elements of, or prerequisites for proper conduct, by a director.16 Violation of the
duty of good faith could remove directors’ protections from liability. The
Delaware Court also ruled that corporate officers owe the same fiduciary duties as
corporate directors, noting that it is not possible to discharge properly either the
duty of care or the duty of loyalty without acting in good faith with respect to the
interests of the companies’ constituents.17 Major legislation such as The SarbanesOxley Act of 200218, or The Dodd–Frank Act19 of 2010 support these legal
14

Kenneth M. Rosen, Meador Lecture Series 2005-2006: Fiduciaries, 1041.
See Kenneth M. Rosen, “Meador Lecture Series 2005-2006: Fiduciaries.”
16
See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753-57 (Del. Ch. 2005) (identifying
possible duty of good faith), aff’d, 906 A.2d 693 (Del. 2006) (affirming the decision of the
Chancellor).
17
Michael Follett, “Note: Gantler V. Stephens: Big Epiphany or Big Failure? A look at the current
state of officers’ fiduciary duties and advice for potential protection,” 35 Del. J. Corp. L., 563
(2010).
18
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PL 107-204, 116 Stat 745. Sarbanes-Oxley requires corporate
officers to be responsible for earnings reports, prohibits accounting firms from acting as
consultants to accounting clients (a conflict of interest) and increases penalties for fraud.

15
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standards and require that directors and their corporations return to these
fundamental principles to which they were formally subject already: individual
integrity and responsibility in corporate governance; and, accountable and
transparent disclosure of important financial and other information on which
investors and the stability of the capital markets depend.20
The Court has long held that the board of directors is ultimately
responsible for the management of the corporation,21 although boards often
delegate major decisions to corporate officers with more expertise and
information on a particular subject. Under Delaware corporate law, officers are
granted titles and duties through the corporation’s bylaws or the board’s
resolutions and employees who are not granted this power are deemed agents.22
Additionally, Delaware law dictates that the terms “officers” or “agents” are by
no means interchangeable: officers are the corporation, but an agent is an
employee and does not have the equivalent status of an officer.23 Agents’ specific
duties include loyalty, performance, obedience, notification, and accounting.
Again, we see this distinction between officers as managers of the
corporation and agents as employees as contrary to the historical and case law
definitions espoused by two leading Chief Justices. It is noteworthy that agents as
employees (and fiduciaries) are not required to act in a manner that ensures that
organizational activities are conducted in good faith and with care for
stakeholder’s interests. Also noteworthy is the omission in corporate law of the
duty of obedience (to obey the law), which appeared to occupy a recognized place
in corporations through 1946 but eventually was eliminated. As recent courts have
made clear that corporate actors cannot consciously violate, or permit the
corporation to violate, corporate and non-corporate norms, even when it may be
profitable for the corporation, this duty may be resurfacing.24 The recent Disney
decision specifically defines the current required triad of fiduciary duties.25

19

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173,
(2010).
20
Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Directors Fiduciary Duties After Sarbanes-Oxley (Atlanta: Kilpatrick
Stockton LLP), 2003.
21
Delaware General Corporation Law section 141(a) provides that “[t]he business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 141(a)(2006).
22
See Michael Follett, note 57.
23
24

Michael Follett, note 57.
Alan R. Palmiter, citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364-65 (Del. 2006), Graham V. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963), and Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698
A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996), where directors breached the duty of care for ‘sustained or
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The Duty of Loyalty
“[T]he duty of loyalty mandates that the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders takes precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or
controlling shareholder and… is not limited to cases involving a financial or other
cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the
fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”26 The duty of loyalty is often described as a
obligation of directors to protect the interests of the company and its stockholders,
to refrain from decisions that would injure the company or deprive the company
of profit or an advantage that might properly be brought to the company for it to
pursue, and to act in a manner that he or she believes is in good faith to be in the
best interests of the company and its stockholders.27 Recent case law also adds
that the duty of loyalty requires boards to act “affirmatively and in good faith.”28
The Duty of Care
The duty of care is defined as ‘… that amount of care which ordinarily careful
and prudent men would use in similar circumstances.’29 Courts review the
standard of care in directors’ decision-making process, not the substance of
decisions thus limiting director liability for failure in risky decisions. A breach of
the duty of care may be found when a director is grossly negligent if the substance
of the board’s informed decision cannot be “attributed to any rational business
purpose.”30 In response to the financial crisis, legislation has specifically
addressed the need for increased risk assessment in our financial institutions,
requiring increased disclosure to ensure that effective reporting systems are in
place and that all relevant information has been evaluated to ensure financial and

systematic failure’ to assure existence of reporting systems that identify illegal corporate conduct,
e.g., medical referral kickbacks, 459.
25

In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d. 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006).
26
Thomas A. Uebler, “Shareholder Police Power: Shareholders’ Ability to Hold Directors
Accountable for Intentional Violations of Law,” 33 Del. J. Corp. L., 199 (2008).
27
Thomas A. Uebler, “Shareholder Police Power: Shareholders’ Ability to Hold Directors
Accountable for Intentional Violations of Law,” 201.
28
See Thomas A. Uebler.
29
In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753-57 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 693
(Del. 2006) .
30
In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d. 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006)), quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971), and Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985),
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economic stability. The duty of care is often perceived as a minimal standard, but
addressing the impact of risk could increase the importance of this standard.
The Duty to Act in Good Faith
In the Disney case, the court stated that “Good faith has been said to require an
“honesty of purpose,” and a genuine care for the fiduciary’s constituents…”31 A
director acts in “subjective bad faith” when his actions are “motivated by an
actual intent to do harm” to the corporation, and bad faith can take different forms
with varying degrees of culpability.32 The court clearly ruled that the duty of good
faith cannot be satisfied if directors act in subjective bad faith, consciously
disregard their duties, actually intend to harm the corporation, or cause the
corporation to knowingly violated the law.33
Most legal scholars disagree as to the practical importance of the duty of
good faith, but proponents of managerial accountability in corporate governance
look to the doctrine of good faith because the traditional duties of care and loyalty
do very little to discipline boards, even if allegations of self-dealing were made
(i.e., violations of duty of loyalty).34 The Disney decision was critical for
corporate governance since the court recognized that conduct that benefits the
corporation must be done with proper motives in order to satisfy the duty of good
faith, thus making boards and senior managers more accountable for their
decisions. Implicit in these recent cases is the assumption that new rules of
“conduct” may be useful in restoring trust to a doubting public. To more fully
understand these new rules of ethical conduct we must turn to the historical
origins of fiduciary principles.

ORIGINS OF FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES
Biblical and Early History
If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development.

31

In re Walt Disney.
In re Walt Disney, at 55.
33
Peter C. Kostant , “Meaningful Good Faith: Managerial Motives and the Duty to Obey the Law,”
424,426.
32

34

See Peter C. Kostant , 426-427.
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Aristotle, 4th Century BCE

35

The historical definition of a “fiduciary” was stated in terms of “an essential code
of conduct for those who have been entrusted to care for other peoples’ property,”
carry out transactions, work for another, or aid persons who were vulnerable and
dependent upon others.36 The breadth and complexity of early trust relationships
is implicit in today’s corporate organizational structure and business relationships.
As early as 1790 B.C., the Code of Hammurabi (a Babylonian code of laws)
established rules of law governing business conduct, or fiduciary considerations,
for the behavior of agents (employees) entrusted with property.37 For example, a
merchant’s agent was required to keep receipts and to pay triple damages for
failing to provide promised goods, although an exception was allowed if losses
were due to enemy attack during a journey.38 The insightful research of several
scholars traces the religious roots of the fiduciary principle to the Old and New
Testaments.39 For example, the Lord told Moses that it is a sin not to restore that
which is delivered unto a man to keep safely, and penalties must be paid for the
violation,40 (i.e., duties of loyalty and due care); the right to fair treatment in the
marketplace,41 implying a responsibility to conduct transactions in good faith; and
the unjust steward who, expecting to be fired, curries favor with his master’s
debtors by allowing them to repay less than their full debts, illustrating the precept
that one cannot serve two masters.42 Additionally, the law on pledges obligates
everyone to establish his own trustworthiness by carrying out the agreements he
has made and by being sensitive to the needs of those who depend on him to meet

35

Amanda H. Podany, ‘Why Study History? A View from the Past,” Presented at The History
Summit I, California State University Dominguez Hills, May 29, 2008.
36
See Kenneth Silber, “Fiduciary Matters,” www.AdvisorOne.com/article/fiduciarymatters, June
28, 2011.
37

Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., “Natural Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Managers,” Journal of Markets
& Morality (2005), 8:27-51.
38
Kenneth Silber, “Fiduciary Matters.”
39
See Brian P. Schaefer, “Shareholders Social Responsibility,” Journal of Business Ethics (2008),
81:297-312; and Stephen B. Young, “Fiduciary Duties as a Helpful Guide to Ethical DecisionMaking in Business, Journal of Business Ethics (2007), 74:1-15.
40
John H. Walton, Deuteronomy: An Exposition of the Spirit of the Law, Grace Theological
Journal 8, 2(1987), 213-25, quoting Leviticus 6:2-5.
41
See John H. Walton, quoting Deuteronomy 25:13-16.
42
John H. Walton notes that the precept that one cannot serve two masters in Luke 16:1-13 was later
cited by scholar Austin Scott in an influential 1949 paper “The Fiduciary Principle,” which
describes boards’ and officers’ responsibility to shareholders and not to other constituents.
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their needs (i.e., loyalty of master to servant, employer to employee, seller to
buyer, powerful to vulnerable). 43
Fiduciary roles were likened to the roles of stewards in early religious and
business history as well as in later corporate development. In this context,
“Fiduciary law secularized a particular religious tradition and applied it to
commercial pursuits,” where the shepherd tending his flocks may be likened to a
fiduciary (steward or employer) or an agent (servant or employee) tending the
sheep for the owner of the flock.44 The ‘steward,’ may be described as a moral
agent or representative of “God,” a corporate partner or stakeholder whose profits
could be distributed by the steward to the poor at year’s end.45 Also, the King (as
steward) was described as God's representative responsible for administering the
covenant (agreements) for the people, and who must avoid preoccupation with the
trappings of office while observing the law.46 Thus, the king may be described as
a model of godliness to the people by governing in a way that conforms to the
requirements of the covenant.47
The increasing complexity in fiduciary relationships over time is equated
to the increasing complexity in the relationship between man and God (as owner)
in early biblical history. The relationships change as a function of the increase in
the complexity of the duties demanded of the steward (manager of covenants).
Similarly, the steward is the precursor to the modern professional fiduciary as
well as to those corporate directors or officers who owe a duty of care to the
owners (shareholders) of the corporation as well as a duty of loyalty to all
43

John H. Walton, “Deuteronomy: An Exposition of the Spirit of the Law,” quoting Deuteronomy
24:14-15.
44
See Stephen B. Young, “Fiduciary Duties as a Helpful Guide to Ethical Decision-Making in
Business.”
45
Sarah Key, “Toward a New Theory of the Firm: A Critique of Stakeholder ‘Theory’,”
Management Decision (1999), 37:317-328.
46
John H. Walton, quoting Deuteronomy 17:14-20, 216.
47
Stephen B. Young details the link between fiduciary and ethical duties in the four covenants, or
agreements, between God and man in the Old Testament that establishes and expands man’s duties
of care. These covenants allow stewards to impose ethical duties on those who obey them (i.e.,
agents or employees) and reflect the core of modern agency and fiduciary relationships: 1) The
first covenant establishes Noah as steward of God’s will to care for creation, and if Noah and his
descendents take good care of creation it would not be destroyed (duty of care for the owner’s
property); 2) The second covenant requires Abraham to accept the duty to behave according to a
code of holy behavior in return for protection (protection from liability for accepting the
responsibilities of duty of loyalty and care); 3) The third covenant requires the children of Israel to
behave morally with religious devotion in return for protection of all of society (extending
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care from an individual to society, i.e., to all stakeholders); The
fourth covenant expanded these promises – if the conduct of all mankind is ethical and moral and
not based on material temptations, Jesus will protect them on earth and grant them entry into
heaven (fiduciary duties are deeply rooted in moral principles).
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stakeholders and to the larger society. Stewards, or fiduciaries, “hold offices with
authority, power and privileges set by law or custom, separate from individual
personalities, and such office demands moral duties in private conduct, requiring
new decision-making habits and reflective capacities that transcend selfishness.”48
Similar to the descriptions of fiduciaries by Justices Cardozo and Brandeis, the
description of stewards implies an inherent willingness to serve others (a moral
duty), and a willingness to subordinate one’s interests to that of others by
acceptance of the duty to serve. Both in early law and today, the fiduciary, or
steward, is evaluated and compensated for his performance and understands that
failure to fulfill his duties will result in penalties. While today’s corporations
seldom attribute morality to a deity in fiduciary law, acceptance of fiduciary
duties does require selflessness and a willingness to subordinate the fiduciary’s
interests to that of another. Aristotle, who lived from 384 B.C. to 322 B.C.,
influenced the development of fiduciary principles, recognizing that in economics
and business, people must be bound by high obligations of loyalty, honesty and
fairness, and that when such obligations aren't required or followed, society
suffers.49
Fiduciaries in Ancient Law
Modern fiduciary law is traceable to developments in Ancient Roman law and
early English law. Ancient Roman law defined fiduciary relationships as both
moral and legal relationships of trust. For centuries until the end of the 18th
Century, Roman law refined and formalized fiduciary law, recognizing various
“trust” (fiducia) contracts in which a person held property in safekeeping or
otherwise acted on another’s behalf (the core duties of loyalty and due care), and
acted in good “faith” (fides) (core duties of honesty, full disclosure and applied
diligence). Failure to uphold such trust could result in monetary penalties as well
as a formal “infamy” (infamia), in which one lost rights to hold public office or to
be a witness in a legal case.50 These fiduciary relationships in early Roman law
were later incorporated into British courts of equity and then into AngloAmerican law, providing standards for modern corporate law.51
Early English law established the role of steward or agent with the
granting of the Magna Carta, an English legal charter issued in 1215 which
allowed the King to grant charters (companies) yet retain sovereignty (ownership)

48
49
50
51

See Stephen B. Young and Joseph F. Johnston, Jr.
John H. Walton, “Deuteronomy: An Exposition of the Spirit of the Law,”
See Kenneth Silber, “Fiduciary Matters.”
See Kenneth M. Rosen, Meador Lecture Series 2005-2006: Fiduciaries.”
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in the charter while recognizing the recipient’s limited rights.52 The King served
as steward, with fiduciary rights (ownership) in the management of his property
but was required to place the interests of his subjects (inferior rights) above his
own – a fiduciary relationship. Increasing population growth caused the King to
transfer his role as steward to town leaders, creating an early form of agency
(master to servant). Scholars describe the king’s stewardship duties as similar to
the legal or fiduciary duties ascribed primarily to boards of directors and senior
officers.53 Town leaders were similar to “agents” or employees who owed duties
to their “stewards” or employers (managers). The continued development of
Charter companies and later private companies, during the era of industrialization
and specialization in business of the 1700-1800s, formalized the role of
fiduciaries and their specific duties.
Early common law separated management from ownership (investors),
creating the office of “manager” to protect the interests of investors and to prevent
corporate self-dealing.54 Subsequently, fiduciary duties were attached to such
office, and stewardship duties were borrowed from early law and applied to
positions of responsibility to promote financial goals. Thus, although a
“fiduciary” is a term described by legal statute, case law or professional codes of
conduct, this term also describes ethical obligations and duties in a wide variety of
business and personal activities and encompasses a “legal or moral recognition of
trust, reliance, or dependence and of responsibility often ignored” 55
A MODEST PROPOSAL: NEW RULES OF FIDUCIARY CONDUCT
Legal standards for management behavior can be traced to “deeply rooted moral
standards” that shaped the "fiduciary principle, a principle of natural law
incorporated into the Anglo-American legal tradition underlying the duties of
good faith, loyalty and care that apply to corporate directors and officers.” 56
Scholars examined early fiduciary history as a potential solution to understanding
corporate misconduct, suggesting that revisiting those early fiduciary principles
might answer the questions: To what standards should managers be held?; and

52

See Stephen B. Young, “Fiduciary Duties as a Helpful Guide to Ethical Decision-Making in
Business.”
53
See Kenneth M. Rosen, “Meador Lecture Series 2005-2006: Fiduciaries.”
54
Richard Marens and AndrewWicks, “Getting Real: Stakeholder Theory, Managerial Practice, and
the General Irrelevance of Fiduciary Duties Owed to Shareholders,” Business Ethics Quarterly
(1999), 273-293.
55
Sarah W. Holtman, “Fiduciary Relationships,” in The Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd Ed,
eds. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (NY: Routledge, 2001), 545-49.
56
See Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., “Natural Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Business Managers.”

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2010

11

Journal of Religion and Business Ethics, Vol. 2 [2010], Art. 5

What are the historical and conceptual bases for these standards?57 Alternatively,
if one assumes that fiduciaries are responsible to the company’s shareholders as
well as to a wider set of constituents, one might ask questions such as: In whose
interests does the company presently function?; and, In whose interests should it
function in the future?58 The latter set of questions not only asks who is served by
the company, but also suggests that stakeholders bear some general rights as
citizens, and should be protected against an abuse of power or violation that
causes injury, as citizens.
If the role of a fiduciary is ascribed only to corporate boards and officers
or to licensed professionals, corporate misconduct at other levels may go
undetected. Despite this, corporate management argues that directors and officers
are responsible only to shareholders, and that corporate management cannot serve
two masters, i.e., multiple groups of stakeholders. To the contrary, history has
demonstrated that fiduciary duties have been and can be the responsibility of all
corporate members, and these duties may be extended to all stakeholders and the
larger society. Research supports the theory that the corporation should have one
set of duties for multiple stakeholders, an argument made by managers in the
1990s that managers had the skills and independence to mediate fairly among the
firm’s stakeholders, and could assemble innovative teams capable of expanding
wealth and economic opportunity.59 Managers sustained this claim well into the
1990s, both within their firms and within their major business associations but by
1997 pressure from the global commodity and national financial markets
persuaded managers to revise their stakeholder standard. The perception is that
managers moved from a focus on a single duty of loyalty to shareholders, to a
narrower focus on making their principals (shareholders) and themselves rich,
while disassociating themselves from the ideal of widening economic opportunity
and improving living standards for the many.60 The Clarkson Principles, a set of
principles for stakeholder management, are considered to be a critical academic
effort to revive the idea that managers should be obligated to expand material
opportunities for the many through economic growth.61 Additionally, compliance
with fiduciary duties can reduce the principal’s costs of monitoring and
disciplining agents and lessens the need for government regulation.62
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Today, although most major corporations support the idea of corporate
social responsibility (CSR), and believe that CSR and profit maximization work
together, they continue to support the Freidman view that “The social
responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”63 A top executive of a major
oil company illustrates this view in the comment that “a socially responsible way
or working is not… a distraction from our core business. Nor does it in any way
conflict with our promise and our duty to deliver value to our shareholders.”64
We propose that adherence to a new understanding and rule of fiduciary
principles goes hand in hand with CSR and profit maximization and is perhaps the
missing link in today’s corporate governance. The essential definition of a
fiduciary does not change – a fiduciary is a person who has a duty to act primarily
for the benefit of another. However, the role of the fiduciary should extend to all
corporate members, and the duties of the fiduciary should not differ regardless of
the specific function or distinction in roles. The primary focus of all corporate
members continues to be to the shareholders (owners of the corporation), but
duties toward other stakeholders should be consistent with those duties to
shareholders. Any differentiation lowers the high standard of fidelity required of
fiduciaries. Thus, the duties of loyalty, good faith, due care and obedience to the
law should be incorporated fully into all fiduciary relationships, regardless of role
or function within the corporation.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
“Many of the most shocking examples of corporate misbehaviors involve conduct
that violates existing law.”65 This result occurs when most cost-benefit analysis
weighs the potential harm and subsequent penalties against the potential profits,
resulting in an ethical question often ignored because of the focus on maximizing
shareholder profitability. Therefore, reform initiatives for boards of directors and
corporate governance “without proper attention to ethical obligations will likely
prove ineffectual.”66 Schwartz et al. found that board and officer leadership by
example and action are roles central to the overall ethical and governance
environment of their firms, a leadership role that is reinforced by board members’
legal responsibilities to provide oversight of the financial performance of their
63
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firms – based on the assumption that ethical corporate leadership results in the
best long-term interests of the firm.
Thus, Schwartz et al.’s study of corporate boards of directors demonstrated
that boards have a professional duty expressed as a fiduciary duty to make ethicsbased decisions. We contend that ethics and morals in line with fiduciary
principles must permeate the entire corporate culture, if corporate governance
reform is to succeed. A return to those central values inherent in ethical and
fiduciary duties extended to the greater community as well as to shareholders may
provide more socially responsible guidelines for corporations in this period of
stakeholder demand for increased government regulation. Defining and providing
examples of fiduciary values of honesty, loyalty, integrity responsibility, fairness
and citizenship can provide guidance for corporate fiduciary relationships with all
stakeholders, and provide a more efficient voluntary control mechanism. Thus, we
contend that consistent fiduciary principles should be implemented throughout the
firm, regardless of the corporate member’s function or role.67 This view is
consistent with Friedman’s view, that a corporate executive is an employee of the
owners of the business, owes responsibility to his employers to conduct the
business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make as
much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of society, embodied
both in law and ethical custom.68
Our review of the historical and religious origins of fiduciary relationships
demonstrates that the concept of fiduciary was intended to be both a societal and a
legal principle, and this is consistent with Friedman’s view of obeying the law and
social custom. The leaders of organizations, as stewards, were responsible to the
whole organization, and to society, not just to themselves or shareholders. Perhaps
a revitalization of the stewardship principle is part of the new perspective required
to create sustainable competitive advantage in today’s economy. We believe that
there is room for stakeholder-focused management that does no harm to
shareholder interests while also benefiting a larger constituency, and that
fiduciary duties require the exercise of care, loyalty, obedience and good faith
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with regard to shareholders as well as to all stakeholders and the larger
community.69
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